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Social relations and practices of a world state, or any form of world political 
community (WPC), would require constant support, authorisation and validation 
in a complex and pluralistic world. For Max Weber (1978: 31) the validity of a 
political rule is not a normative concept, but Jürgen Habermas (1976: 97) aptly 
criticises Weber’s empiricism. Legitimacy is not only a matter of 
institutionalised prejudices and behavioural dispositions, but is based also on 
normative validity claims – even though it is also true that a lack of good 
normative reasons is only a potential source of actual conflicts and crises in any 
political community. In this sense, all anticipations of a world state imply claims 
about its legitimation, i.e. possible normative reasons for the validity of its rule 
that could, under favourable circumstances, translate into a ‘public opinion’ 
supporting or at least accepting its rule. The concept of ‘public opinion’ is itself 
reflexively multi-layered and complex, the constitution of which would be part 
of the problem of legitimation in a WPC (cf. Patomäki, 1997: 165-73). 
 
Some of the prevailing anticipations of a world state constitute fairly weak 
claims in terms of its legitimation. For instance, it is often maintained that a 
number of trends and tendencies are pointing towards planetary integration, and 
ultimately, a world state. The number of units has been declining. Although 
developments have not been linear, the overall trend is striking: from perhaps as 
many as 200,000-300,000 units in 1000 BCE to mere 200 units in 2000 ACE. 
(Carneiro 1978) A parallel trend is towards larger-sized units. Christopher 
Chase-Dunn et.al. (2008) identify several major upward sweeps in the recent 
history of humanity. Upward sweeps are defined as instances in which the 
largest settlements and/or polities significantly increase in size for the first time 
in a given area or globally. So far the peaks have been the Mongolian and 
British empires. Assuming that these trends continue, humanity is likely to end 
up in a single political unit within the next 200-300 years, but would this trend 
(alone) make the rule of this single political unit valid in any sense? 
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Real tendencies are causal and transfactual and thus more profound than mere 
empirical trends. From a scientific realist perspective, Wendt (2003) argues that 
given the generic boundary conditions of the world system, the system is 
directed towards the realisation of a world state. ‘The mechanism that generates 
this outcome is the interaction between struggles for recognition at the micro-
level and cultures of anarchy at the macro’ (ibid.: 507). Wendt argues that 
attempts to use violence in Hegelian struggles over recognition have become 
increasingly expensive and also dysfunctional due to the development of 
technology, especially weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps even more 
importantly, ‘any social order founded on unequal recognition [is] unstable in 
the long run’ (ibid.: 513). ‘Territorial state sovereignty is by very nature a 
structure of unequal recognition’ (ibid.: 515). Thus the logic of recognition must 
result in a global political community, involving a supra-national ‘we’-feeling. 
  
At the ‘macro-level’, the step-by-step problem-solving and learning through 
different ‘cultures of anarchy’ point to the same direction: from Hobbesian state 
of nature, via society of states, world society and collective security, to a world 
state or republic. Moreover, by taking political economy into account as well, 
the cosmopolitan conclusion appears even stronger. Wendt (ibid.: 494) also 
mentions the significance of distributional struggles, but more generally, it can 
be argued that the mechanisms and contradictions of global political economy 
create dilemmas that are not easy to overcome, not even temporarily, without 
adequate collective institutions (cf. Chase-Dunn 1990; Markwell 2006; 
Patomäki 2008), which may also constitute elements of world statehood. 
 
Claims about material and structural tendencies towards a world state constitute 
reasons for normative arguments in favour of a more adequate system of global 
governance or, sometimes, for world government proper.  Since Immanuel Kant 
(1983/1795), K’Ang (2005/1913) and Wells (1902; see also Wagar, 1961), the 
choice facing humanity has often been presented in stark terms: the likely 
alternative to building common global institutions to overcome the problem of 
organized violence is an unthinkably horrific future catastrophe – or even the 
end of humanity. On this basis, Kant himself argued that we have a 
cosmopolitan moral duty to realise a league of nations. He envisaged a 
cosmopolitan moral and legal order, but was opposed to a world state. Many 
later Kantians have thought that only a world state could truly resolve the 
dilemmas of organised violence that Kant so perceptibly analysed.  
 
Also the Hegelian metaphor of ‘struggle for recognition’, when applied to the 
history of humankind as a whole as Wendt does, amounts to a cosmopolitan 
normative argument, which stems from the principle of equality of all humans. 
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This equality can be expressed for instance in terms of political, social or civil 
rights, possibly implying global democracy. Likewise, political economy 
arguments for better global institutions are grounded on normative 
considerations. Political economy arguments for planetary unification profess, 
apart from peace, goals such as rational economic policies; distributive justice; 
autonomy; and democracy. The establishment of adequate global economic 
institutions to govern the world economy would be a step in ‘the long march of 
mankind toward its unity and better control of its own fate’ (Triffin, 1968: 179). 
 
 
The research problem and structure of the paper 
 
Every argument about the possibility, desirability and/or inevitability of a world 
state entails claims and assumptions about its future legitimacy and 
sustainability. To pose questions about the possible basis of legitimacy of a 
world state does not imply a commitment to any particular telos of world 
history. Although I agree with critical cosmopolitans that world history is in 
some way directed towards further planetary integration (see Patomäki, 2010; 
Patomäki & Steger 2010), it does not follow that the telos of this process is 
known. A WPC and its organizational structures may turn out an emergent 
phenomenon; something that cannot be deduced from ex ante reasoning or 
anticipated in essential aspects and regards, but fully known, only ex post to its 
emergence. Hence, the category of ‘state’ may – or may not – be misleading in 
thinking about WPC and organizations, as the term ‘world’ refers to a whole that 
is evolving. An ethico-political goal for the world history as a whole can only be 
set from within history; must be fallible; and can only make sense in terms of 
particular story or scenario told within a particular time-scale. Thus conceived, 
the process leading to an end-state must be more important than the telos itself.1  
 
The point of posing questions about legitimation in a future WPC is shedding 
light on the possible ethico-political grounds for further global integration. 
Among other things, the analysis of elements and dynamics of legitimation also 
facilitates the assessment of the feasibility of different paths towards planetary-
scale integration and potential for conflicts, divisions and subsequent 
disintegration. What are the deep but historically evolving normative and 
institutional underpinnings that could make a sustainable WPC possible? What 
could provide legitimacy to a WPC and thus make it viable; and what are the 
potential and likely pitfalls of such an abstract, large-scale political community? 
  
These questions have been posed before. For instance, Hans Morgenthau (1960: 
522-4) defined a world community as a community of at least partly shared 
moral standards and political judgements and multiple but convergent political 
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actions. He articulated the problem of legitimation in terms of three questions 
(ibid.: 511). (1) Are peoples willing to accept world government, or are they at 
least not so unwilling as to erect an insurmountable obstacle to its 
establishment? (2) Would they be and able to do what is necessary to keep world 
government standing? (3) Would they be willing and able to do or refrain from 
doing what world government requires of them so that it may fulfil its purposes?  
Morgenthau thought he can settle these questions with a few ‘obvious’ 
examples. Would the Americans be ‘prepared to give a world government the 
powers to open up the borders of the United States for the annual immigration 
of, say, 100,000 Russians, 250,000 Chinese, and 200,000 Indians?’ (ibid.: 513). 
Thus, ‘so long as men continue to judge and act in accordance with national 
rather than supranational standards and loyalties, the world community remains 
a postulate that still awaits its realization’ (ibid.: 524). 
 
Morgenthau frames his questions in terms of Max Weber’s (1978: 31) empiricist 
approach: ‘[S]ocial action may be guided by the belief in the existence of a 
legitimate order. The probability that action will actually be so governed will be 
called the validity of the order in question.’ However, the Weberian empiricist 
approach overlooks the underlying, structurally conditioned dispositions and 
liabilities, on the one hand, and the normative aspects of the problem of 
legitimacy, on the other hand. It is true that claims about legitimacy or its lack 
must be relatable, in some way, to the actual preferences of individual people, 
however formed (which is one of the multilayered and complex senses of 
‘public opinion’). Further, those claims must be falsifiable by empirical means. 
It is nonetheless necessary also to explore (i) historically evolving and 
structurally conditioned dispositions and liabilities; (ii) processes of political 
will-formation; and (iii) normative aspects of claims about legitimacy in a way 
that makes it possible to build plausible scenarios about possible futures.  
  
First I discuss the standard security and political economy arguments for a world 
state. Although these arguments are relevant and plausible, the question is 
whether they provide a basis for the possibility of a legitimate planetary political 
community? Could these arguments really constitute an ethico-political ground 
for a fully-fledged self-organizing world political system (i.e. democratic world 
government or something analogical)? As indicated also by the example of the 
European integration, the security-military and functionalist political economy 
arguments for planetary unification may work to a point, but after that they may 
also become irrelevant and in some contexts even counterproductive or self-
defeating. For example, a constant reminder of the potential German security 
threat may turn out a source of divisions rather than support further integration. 
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The problem of legitimacy concern also normative questions: whether and why 
a given order or system deserves the allegiance of its members? Mere security or 
functionalist benefits, especially if perceived in terms of rationally calculative 
orientation of action, are not enough. There must also be a belief in normative 
legitimacy, which may be anchored in the universality principles such as popular 
democracy and human rights. However, there is an internal relationship between 
democracy and identity, and identities tend to be particular. Global-democratic 
‘self’-determination would presuppose a ‘we’ and ‘us’. Who is this ‘we’? 
Furthermore, what also matters are the moral standards and political judgements 
that constitute the multiple political actions and struggles over the definition of 
different ‘selves’ and ethico-political directions in the future WPC. I explore 
theories of civilizing process and stages of ethico-political learning and focus 
especially on their implications to the process of legitimation in a WPC.  
 
 
Legitimacy and the materialist, structuralist and functionalist arguments for a 
world state 
 
Every argument for a world state is also a proposal for the basis of its 
legitimation after its establishment. For instance, those advocating the classical 
security-military argument try to convince, in a Hobbesian manner,2 the rational 
members of their audience to submit their wills to a central authority in order to 
avoid risking a major military catastrophe in the future (Deudney, 2000 and 
2008: ch 8; K’Ang, 2005; Morgenthau, 1960: 530-9; Wagar, 1961, 1999; Wells, 
1902; Wendt, 2003: 516-28). As anticipated by Kant and later K’Ang and 
H.G.Wells, the system of separate states is loaded with powers of destruction 
characteristic of the planetary-nuclear era: jet airplanes, rockets and missiles, 
satellites and nuclear explosives.3 These powers may remain idle for a relatively 
long time, say until 2044, or 2100, or even further into the 22nd century, yet 
under particular – however exceptional – future circumstances they may come to 
be instigated, resulting in a global disaster. Similarly, one can argue that in order 
to overcome ‘the tragedy of commons’ (Hardin 1968) which may threaten our 
survival as a species, we need a common state. Especially when securitised in 
this manner, climate change and other critical biosphere-related issues can be 
framed as just as salient as the potential for a major military catastrophe in the 
future. Once a world-state is in place, every rational actor is then assumed to 
accept the validity of its rule out of (sheer or generalized) self-interest. 
 
The security-military argument is conceptually ambiguous. It is ambiguous ex 
ante of the establishment of a world state or anything analogical, because the 
Hobbesian argument is meant to justify obedience to an existing state (by 
warning people what would happen if they did not obey), not to justify creating 
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a new one. From an ex ante perspective, the security-military argument is 
vulnerable to the collective action problem. (See fn 2; and Wendt, 2003: 509).  
Ex post, or after, the establishment of a global state, this argument would all too 
easily serve as a constant reminder of the potential threat posed by concrete 
others and related stories about past wrong-doings. Moreover, the argument is 
conservative: it justifies any order against any claims to change. Yet, there will 
always be disputes and conflicts between social forces. There can never be a 
stable ‘order’, an eternally fixed set of practices and institutions. It is not 
possible to tame or freeze history for a long time. History is a changing and 
open-ended process. New interests and claims will emerge and new ‘messages’ 
demanding changes will be sent and made public.  
 
The security-military argument may thus become counterfinal from the point of 
view of establishing a security community (Deutsch et.al., 1957; Lijphart, 1981; 
Patomäki, 2002: ch 8; Adler & Barnett, 2008). To simplify: if, despite sustained 
efforts, there is no responsiveness from the side of status quo forces, a 
pathological learning process may occur among the advocators of changes. Over 
time, this may lead to the escalation of conflict and (threats of) violence. The 
preparedness to use large-scale violence inside and/or outside indicates non-
integration and is a sign of an insecurity community – inside and outside. In 
contrast, security communities are characterised by the expectation that future 
changes are going to be peaceful; and that the others can be trusted in a generic 
manner. Regional or global integration generates non-preparedness to use 
violence. This can be explicated as follows: 
 
A1. If a social system has become integrated, no relevant actor has any 
reasons to prepare for the use of political violence. 
A2. As actors know (A1), they do not expect anybody to use political 
violence either to preserve status quo or to foster changes. 
B1. Non-preparedness becomes a generally followed and rarely, if ever, 
questioned rule of action. 
B2. In the course of social time, (A2) becomes an automatic, routine-like 
and self-evident presupposition of political thought, argumentation and 
action. 
 
Thus in stage B, the security argument fades into the social background of the 
‘the-taken-for-granted’; and the security community becomes and asecurity 
community, in which security is no more an issue. The case of European 
integration seems to support this generic conclusion. The security-military 
argument is being used to legitimise the EU, and it has motivating power among 
some actors, but its factual role tends to be limited. Instead of just contributing 
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to ‘we’-feeling and collective identity, the security-military argument can also 
reinforce the separation of different identities and ‘public opinions’ and also for 
that reason, stage B2 may not be reached. 
 
These problems probably explain why – despite the dramatic force of the 
security-military argument – functionalist political economy arguments are 
usually more popular. A number of contemporary issues and contradictions of 
global political economy require trans- and supranational co-operation and 
institutions, with at least some centralised direction. Practical-technical co-
operations that imply de facto or de jure sharing of sovereignty and common 
institutions are steps towards a world state. (Weiss, 2009) Moreover, from this 
point of view, a world state may come to be organised along functionalist lines; 
it does not have to resemble existing territorial states (see e.g. Partington, 2003; 
Wells, 2002). The functionalist line of argumentation for a world state comes 
close to the Monnet-method of European integration. The economistic 
expectation of many functionalists such as David Mitrany is that political 
loyalties and, and thereby mainstream beliefs in the legitimacy of the system, 
should more or less automatically follow the transfer of technical, economic and 
welfare functions from the nation-state to international and supranational 
organizations. After the failure of the post-World War II federalistic projects, 
the Western European integration process started as a functionalistic system of 
cooperation loosely along the lines of the theories of Jean Monnet (as officially 
articulated by Schuman, 1994) and David Mitrany (1943; 1975). Despite some 
attempts to introduce explicitly political notions such as citizenship, this 
approach still characterizes the development of the EU. 
 
However, the legitimation problems of the EU – as is evident from several 
unfavourable referenda to the 2010 crisis of the EMU – have also shown the 
limits of the Monnet-method (for a theoretical analysis, see Patomäki, 1997). 
Although functionalist and neo-functionalist theories are motivated by critical-
reflexive moral considerations, the basic thrust of the economistic-functionalist 
argument seems to presuppose the fulfilment of Weber’s historical scenario 
about the development of capitalism, in which the operations of the abstract, 
quantitative and most impersonal media, money, displace all action-orientations 
other than the rationally calculative orientation, and especially those that are 
based on ethico-political values or any meanings considered significant to the 
lives and actions of individuals and collectives (for discussions, see Weber, 
1978). To the extent that (i) the instrumentalist orientation prevails in society 
and (ii) trans- or supranational co-operation is widely seen as more efficient than 
national, the functionalist argument – abstracted from a wider social context and 
its inbuilt normative principles – may possibly work to a certain point.  
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However, these conditions can never be met more than partially. Although 
Weber has been right about the overall trend of the 20th century history, the 
displacement of other action-orientations can never be completed (see 
Habermas, 1981 and 1984; Connolly 1993). Moreover, there have also been 
counter-movements working against the tenets of Weberian modernisation (as 
well as against related processes of commodification in the Marxian sense). 
Thus attempts to push functionalist political economy integration beyond the 
limits of prevailing loyalties, solidarities and ethico-political sentiments are 
insufficient and may also become counterproductive in terms of reactions 
against the implied instrumentalism, utilitarism and accompanying 
commodification, however moral the underlying motivation may be. 
 
Another problem with the security and functionalist arguments is that they 
ignore the lessons of the historical processes of modern state-formation. Modern 
European states could not have succeeded in progressively establishing their 
legitimate monopoly over violence by just dispossessing their competitors of 
instruments of physical violence by stronger means of violence. Neither did they 
prove their worth by mere technical-functionalist means. They also engaged in 
what Norbert Elias (1978) calls the ‘civilizing process’, involving the adoption 
of religious pluralism among states and, often, also religious freedom within the 
state; and embraced new universalising principles while forging particular 
national imaginaries to justify and legitimise their territorial rule.  
 
 
The ’civilizing’ process and stages of ethico-political learning 
 
Between 1776 and 1848 there arose on both sides of the Atlantic universalistic 
principles of rights and justice. However, att this geo-historical moment, many 
in Europe were still more than willing to sacrifice their lives for the divine rights 
of the dynastic rulers and aristocracy and thus fight against the American and 
French revolutions and related universalizing principles. Moreover, production 
remained based on land and agriculture (the Industrial Revolution started to 
have transformative effects in Britain only from the 1820s onwards); and the 
speed of communication and transportation across the surface of the planet was 
limited to the velocity of humans, horses and sailing ships. Under these 
circumstances, universalizing principles could only be realized ‘nationally’.  
 
The collective identity of citizens developed under the abstract viewpoints of 
legality, morality, and sovereignty, especially through modern natural-law 
constructions and in formalist ethics. According to Habermas (1979: 115), ‘these 
abstract determinations are best suited to the identity of world citizens, not to 
that of the citizen of a particular state. [... ]’. Under these circumstances, the 
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resources of the ‘nation-state’ were harnessed to forge and circulate prototypes, 
metaphors and frames that would legitimize its rule. The new national categories 
also captured the imagination of historians, philosophers and poets. 
Thus, nationalism became a transformative force in the modernizing world. 
Nationhood found its concrete political expression in the transformation of 
subjects into citizens who laid claim to equal membership in the nation and 
institutionalized their autonomy within the modern nation-state. But who really 
counted as part of the people and what constituted the essence of the nation 
became the subject of fierce intellectual debates and social struggles. The 
‘national imaginary’ corresponds to what Anderson (1991) has called ‘modern 
imaginings of the nation’ as a spatially limited and sovereign community of 
individuals. Their knowledge of each other was, in most cases, not direct, but 
mediated in ‘homogenous, empty time’ through the diffusion of discursive 
literacy and the prototypes, categories, metaphors, and framings cultivated 
within it. To a large extent, the national imaginary was made possible by the 
invention of printing technology embedded in nascent capitalism. 
  
To the extent that my criticism of the incompleteness and potentially 
counterproductive nature of the materialist, structuralist and functionalist 
arguments for world integration is correct, a WPC requires a global imaginary 
and a related ‘civilizing’ process. A world state or, more generally, a WPC is 
unlikely to emerge, or be sustainable, without a ‘civilizing’ and story-telling 
process appropriate for the identity of world citizens. A key question is: would 
this ‘civilizing’ and story-telling process resonate with deep tendencies 
underlying actual geo-historical events, episodes and trends? Are there reasons 
to believe that world history is somehow – inevitably or otherwise – taking 
humanity into a cosmopolitan direction; and that attempts to ‘civilize’ 
humankind further and cultivate planetary stories about the common fate of 
humanity are thus grounded on deep non-contingent logics or mechanisms?  
 
Wendt (2003: 510-16) relies on Hegel’s metaphorical story about the ‘struggle 
for recognition’ in arguing that only a global political community can ensure an 
equal, symmetric and stable collective identity and solidarity. This Hegelian 
story is instructive, but its epistemological and ontological status is unclear. It is 
based on assumptions human desire and constitution of Self that may appear 
plausible to some, or even perhaps to many, yet they do not seem to be grounded 
on claims with falsifiable implications. Thus Wendt’s interpretation of Hegel’s 
story may be indicative of the possibility of a trans-historical logic taking 
humanity towards a WPC, but not much more. 
 
Andrew Linklater (1982; 1990; 1998; 2007) has articulated an alternative – and 
more normatively oriented – account of the reasons for believing in the gradual 
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emergence of a WPC. From the viewpoint of ethical universalism (1982), he 
argues that the success or failure of the critical theory of international relations 
will be determined by the amount of light cast on present possibilities of change 
towards a universal human moral community (1991: 172). Linklater’s idea is 
that by knowing the factors contributing to the development of the moral 
community of humankind, or cosmopolis, it should be possible to strengthen, 
perhaps even in a somewhat instrumentalist manner, these alternative 
tendencies. For example, Linklater maintains that the capitalist world economy 
has generated complex interdependencies and various transnational forces that 
are assembling the conditions for a universal human community. (See Linklater, 
1991; 1998; 2007) The overall argument is, as in the case of Wendt, indicative; 
there seem to be a number of normative, sociological and geo-historical reasons 
to expect the emergence and, then, consolidation of a WPC. 
 
Arguably, both Linklater’s project of critical theory and Wendt’s Hegelian story 
are essentially about collective learning. Ethical universalism is a result of 
collective learning, although, for the time being, various geo-historical factors 
and social conditions and prevent it from being adopted widely enough. The 
Hegelian story about the dialectical movement of one moment of ‘recognition’ 
to another depicts essentially an ideal-typical human learning process. In real 
geo-historical time, each moment can last up to centuries, or even more. 
Similarly, a ‘civilizing process’ is based on increasing awareness and respect for 
other people’s point of view (Linklater, 2007: 162). In effect, the concept refers 
to the collective learning of humanity, but in an unspecified way. 
 
As Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Habermas and other have argued, there are 
good and empirically confirmed reasons to think that certain kinds of cognitive 
structures emerge in a logical order that constitute what can be called ‘stages’ 
(seen as iconic models of generic structures, idealized and abstracted from 
complex and in some ways also vague and ambiguous reality).4 Stages are inner 
generative of cognitive processing embodied in the habitus of individuals.5 Each 
higher stage is able to answer questions or problems unsolved at the next lower 
stage. A partial analogy can be made between individual and collective learning, 
although there are also major ontological and normative differences between the 
two. In both cases the sequence of cognitive stages is conceptual-logical rather 
than just empirically correct. This explains why an individual can reach higher 
stages in a sufficiently enabling context spontaneously and why the order of 
learning must be roughly the same in both cases. The generative structures of 
reasoning can become to be embedded in social practices and institutions, 
although this is always contingent on many things, including political struggles.  
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Collective human learning sheds light for instance on the quest for 
democratization. Rules are not anymore taken as something external to 
individual actors and thus sacred or conventional in the authoritative sense; but 
rather come to be felt as the free product of mutual agreement and an 
autonomous conscience. In other words, actors come to understand that 
collective rules are the product of their autonomy and free, mutual agreement 
(Piaget, 1977: 24-5; Kohlberg, 1971: 164-5). Collective learning also points 
towards cosmopolitan moral sentiments. At the critical-reflexive level of 
reasoning, morality and general ethico-political principles must have validity 
and application apart from (i) the authority of the groups or persons holding 
these principles; and (ii) apart from the individuals own identification with any 
particular groups or institutions. Critical-reflexive ethico-political orientation is 
thus fully apt only for world citizens. 
 
Normative validity is of course different from the actual course of history. 
Collective learning occurs via political debates and struggles that can take the 
form of: consensus or compromise agreements; dialogues and debates; majority-
decisions; manipulation of the background context; outright force; or a 
combination of these. Typically asymmetric relations of structural power favour 
quite systematically a particular outcome. Moreover, history is open-ended: 
even if an end-point should have been achieved, the future must remain open. In 
this critical-reflexive sense, there is nothing final about any particular historical 
telos such as global democracy realized within the framework of a world 
political community of some sort. Thus understood, global democracy is not the 
only purpose or the ultimate end-point of human history; but it provides a 
normatively compelling direction to the world history in the 21st century. 
 
 
The problem of collective identity: who are ‘we’? 
 
Collective learning anticipates a telos of world history in which all others are 
recognised and constituted as fully autonomous subjects with a legitimate social 
standing in relation to the Self. This telos can only be realized within the 
framework of common planetary institutions. However, global solidarity and 
common institutions would raise a new problem. Can there be any solidarity 
without a common identity at some level of human beingness? Is a shared global 
political identity possible only if it implies different outsiders, understood 
largely in negative evaluative terms, perhaps antagonistically as enemies? 
 
Would a global identity thus require outsiders to the humankind as a whole? 
Arash Abizadeh (2005) explains how many of the standard arguments, 
according to which collective identity presupposes human others, are fallacious. 
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Followers of Hegel tend to commit the fallacy of composition. Even though 
individual self-consciousness may require recognition by others, and although 
the identity of individuals may be dialogically constructed, it does not follow 
that collective identities are constructed in the same way. Collectively, nothing 
else is required than the mutual recognition of, and dialogues among, the 
individuals and groups who form that collective identity. It is admittedly true 
that international legal sovereignty (which is a collective identity) presupposes 
recognition by another sovereign (another collective identity), but international 
legal sovereignty is a contingent geo-historical institution, not a metaphysical or 
trans-historical truth. Furthermore, the followers of Carl Schmitt infer the 
actuality and effectivity of collective physical violence from its abstract 
possibility and thus in effect define politics in terms of war. The Schmittians 
thus reify a contingent outcome as an eternal truth about the nature of politics. 
 
However, I concur with the post-structuralists that in human language and 
reasoning negativity and thus some ‘othering’ is inevitable. Thus it is essential 
to go beyond demonstrating negatively the possibility of a global identity; we 
should also ask ‘possible yes, but exactly how?’. If some othering is inevitable, 
what are the possible structures of a global identity-construction? When the aim 
is to avoid repressive, antagonistic and potentially violent self-other relations, 
there are basically three options. Firstly, otherness can be placed outside the 
human species and planet Earth. The cosmic viewpoint provides an important 
source – even a foundation – for global identity although this is not a sufficient 
solution to the problem of identity (see Patomäki, 2010). For instance, calls for 
global solidarity in the face of rapid global warming (e.g. UNDP, 2007) assume 
a shared planetary identity across the currently prevailing differences and 
divisions. Environmentalists correctly maintain that all humans share an 
important thing in common: planet Earth and its sphere of life to which we 
humans essentially belong. Our cultural differences are built on a shared cosmic 
and biological basis. Thus a possible argument for universal morality and 
thereby for world identity involves an idea that we should work together as a 
species to preserve and cultivate life and the human potential on a planetary 
scale, and even beyond, on a cosmic scale. 
 
Secondly, otherness can be located either in our own past or, alternatively, in our 
contemporary being, when seen from a point of view of a possible future 
position in world history. As any process of identity-construction is temporal, 
this constitutes a fruitful perspective, but does not address all the key problems 
or tackle the onto-logical underpinnings of the standard identity-theories. There 
is thus, thirdly, a need to rethink the basic onto-logic of identity from a 
perspective that is compatible with an emerging framework called Big History 
(e.g. Christian, 2005; Patomäki & Steger, 2010). Utilizing the concept of a 
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horizon of moral identification and developing further Todorov’s axis of self-
other relations, it is possible to outline a cosmic, temporal, and relational 
conception of global identity based on both positive and negative elements. 
 
 
Temporalising identities and Geo-Historical Narratives 
 
Any identity is always temporal, not only in the simple sense of being located in 
time (and space), but because ethico-political identity discloses itself as 
sameness over time that can only be established in and through narratives that 
the actors are telling (cf. Ricoeur, 1992: chps 5-6). Modern collective identities 
are constituted through geo-historical stories of actions and characters. It is the 
identity of the story that makes the identity of the actor and character (ibid.: 
148). From a emporal perspective, although othering may in some sense be 
inevitable, the most relevant identity-constituting others need not be those 
contemporary humans on the planet Earth who are in some regards – ethically, 
culturally or otherwise – different from us, whoever we are. 
  
Otherness can also be located either in our own past or, alternatively, in our 
contemporary being, when seen from a point of view of a possible future 
position in world history. In other words, what we are can be defined, through 
stories, in terms of critical distance from what we once used to be. And what we 
may become and would like to become can be defined in terms of critical 
distance from what we are now, in terms of stories involving possible and likely 
future developments. Critical distance from one’s own past entails the 
possibility of normative improvement and ethico-political learning and 
development. A key to a successful overcoming of violent antagonisms seems to 
lie in collective learning via mutual self-criticism. If one looks deep enough, the 
history of every group, every class and every country is filled with episodes that 
not only could but also should have been otherwise. In that sense it is always 
possible to locate layers of negative otherness in one’s own collective past – and 
from a universalizing perspective, we know that this applies to everyone on the 
planet. At this level of universalization, critical distance from one’s own identity 
and from the prevailing ideas and practices of one’s own society does not mean 
inverting established hierarchies or oppositions, but rethinking the hierarchies 
and oppositions in terms of higher-order identities. 
 
A potentially even more important possibility is locating otherness in our 
contemporary being and identity, when seen from a point of view of a possible 
future position in world history. As Wendt argues in terms of the ‘struggle for 
recognition’ story: 
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[…A] world state could compensate for the absence of spatial 
differentiation between its present and its past […]. The past here is 
anarchy, with all its unpleasantness. In Hegelian terms we could say that 
‘history’ becomes the Other in terms of which the global self is defined. Of 
course this Other does not have a subjectivity of its own, and so cannot 
literally recognize the world state. But a functional equivalent to 
recognition can be achieved by an act of temporal self-differentiation. 
(Wendt, 2003: 527) 
 
For Wendt the temporal self-differentiation would occur in the future when the 
world state is established. However, the idea of temporal self-differentiation and 
otherness can be made concrete already now by imagining for instance a future 
historian or sociologist looking back. This device has been successfully utilized 
in some science fiction writings (e.g. Brunner, 1971; Wagar, 1999). The act of 
imagining a future historian generates far-reaching questions about his or her 
identity, about our identity, and about the truth of his or her historical stories and 
explanations. Arguably, our future historian is likely to identify with the 
planetary political community as a whole, possible extending his or her moral 
horizon even way beyond Earth, and looking at the human past from this kind of 
a global vantage point. A leap ahead into the future seems thus to suggest a 
standpoint of some sort of planetary history. This general standpoint does not 
stop interpretation of history from being contested. As in any political 
community, history will be periodically re-interpreted and constantly debated 
also in a future WPC.6 But in contrast to more limited histories, world history 
covers the planetary history of humanity in its entirety. 
 
Karl Jaspers (1953) was one of those who articulated the increasingly common 
sentiment that the world is now a single unit of communications. This, he 
assumed, gives rise to a growing drive toward political unification, maybe 
through mutual agreement in a world order based on the rule of law. For Jaspers, 
this constitutes the beginning of the world history proper. It is ‘the spiritual and 
technical acquisition of the equipment necessary for the journey; we are just 
setting out’ (ibid.: 24). This setting out also entails a new planetary 
understanding of the human past. In fact, H.G.Wells worked on the idea of a 
universal history already in the aftermath of the First World War. In his two-
volume Outline of History, Wells argued for the importance of shared historical 
ideas. “Swifter means of communication have brought all men closer to one 
another for good or for evil” and thus “war becomes a universal disaster”. 
However, there can be no common peace and prosperity without common 
historical ideas; a sense of history as the common adventure of all mankind is 
necessary for peace. (Wells, 1920: v-vi) 
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There had been universal histories – presentations of the history of mankind as a 
whole, as a coherent unit – before Wells, but most of them have told the story in 
Eurocentric terms, often assuming or suggesting that a particular (Christian or) 
Western society constitutes the end-point of world history. In contrast, Wells 
framed the world history cosmic and biological terms and imagined a future 
world society, indeed a world state, thus providing an entirely new, future-
oriented vantage point. Following Wells, a succession of 20th century writers, 
particularly since the rise of environmentalist concern, and the opening of outer 
space, have sought to generate geo-historical narratives of the human past, 
present and future to serve as an ideational unity of a united humanity. The late 
1980s saw a systematic and globalist critique of Eurocentrism rising. The 
colonizers’ model of the world – Eurocentrism – is based on a simple and yet 
false assumption: all important concepts, practices, technologies and capacities 
have emerged from Europe or from Europeanized parts of the world.) The critics 
of Eurocentrism have argued plausibly that this is a biased and one-sided 
account of the common adventure of all mankind (Amin, 1989; Blaut, 1993; 
Blaut, 2000; Frank, 1998; Hobson, 2004; Needham, 2004; Pomeranz, 2000). 
The starting point of the non-centric and neo-Wellsian Big History is that human 
societies remain part of cosmos and nature, ‘properly at home in the universe 
despite our extraordinary powers, unique self-consciousness, and inexhaustible 
capacity for collective learning’ (McNeill 2005: xvii).  
 
McNeill argues further that as natural sciences have been historicized at many 
levels, it is now the task of historians – and social scientists – to generalize 
boldly enough to connect their area of study with the history of the cosmos, 
solar system and life. In this genre, David Christian’s (2005) Maps of Time. An 
Introduction to Big History is a unified story of developments of the whole 
universe from the Big Bang about 13 thousand million years ago through the 
present into its distant future (see also e.g. Brown, 2007). The story of Big 
History is about the emergence of new layers of qualitatively distinct beings and 
development of increasing complexity locally – against the background of the 
second law of thermodynamics that tends to work against complexity in the 
cosmos as a whole (see also Kauffman, 1995; and Wheeler, 2006). From this 
perspective, we can see that life on Earth emerged from cosmic evolution 
(although we do not yet know all the details as of how) and humanity from 
biological evolution (this part is better known). This amounts to a modern 
creation myth with a cosmopolitan intent, told in scientific terms (for a 
discussion on the more Nietzschean and regressive variations of the evolutionary 
themes, see Patomäki, 2010: 16-7). 
 
The so called modern time has been the most dramatic era in the common 
adventure of all humankind thus far. The Eurocentric waves of globalization – 
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starting with the imperial reintegration of the American continent with Europe 
and continuing with the late 19th century and early 20th  century waves of neo-
imperial expansion – have intensified the new global coming together of 
humanity, even if characteristically under violent, oppressive and tragic 
circumstances. The Industrial Revolution led to a rapid global population growth 
from one to nearly seven billion people today; this growth continues at least 
until the benchmark of nine billion will be reached probably in the early 2040s. 
Simultaneously, the Industrial Revolution also complicated and obscured the 
connection between available resources and control over land.  
 
From a Eurocentric perspective, the 19th century appeared exceptional. The core 
of the industrializing world economy seemed to have become relatively 
peaceful, although its outward expansion was violent. Hence, despite recurring 
wars in the colonies, the rise of neo-imperialism from the 1870s onwards, and 
subsequent armament race, the First World War came as an immense surprise to 
most Europeans. Thereby, the 20th century, ‘the age of extremes’ (Hobsbawm, 
1994), began with a largely unanticipated catastrophe, recurring on a truly 
global scale in 1937-1945. Moreover, the Russian revolution is unlikely to have 
occurred without the war (and German support for the Bolshevists). Thus, also 
the Cold War was a co-product of the First World War and its aftermath. It was 
at this time that humanity reached the technological capacity to destroy itself 
and large parts of the ecological systems of the planet; and it was at that time 
that world history proper emerged for the first time. 
 
In a rather Wellsian manner, Big History is necessarily oriented also towards the 
future. Among other things, it presupposes the possibility of collective learning 
and anticipates possibilities such as global security community and much better 
governance of common global processes and problems. These kinds of 
anticipations amount to the process of unification of humanity at least in some 
form, although Christian (2005), like so many others, remains agnostic about the 
possibility of a world state. Big History frames world history in planetary and 
cosmic terms and imagines a future WPC that may also assume the form of a 
world state, thus providing a new vantage point for writing history and viewing 
ourselves. From that perspective, what we are now – whoever we may be in 
terms of our identity – constitutes a form of possibly negative otherness. 
 
 
Redefining the three axis of self-other relations 
 
Big History may provide a rough framework for thinking about who the ‘we’ 
are, but it cannot – and ought not try to – abolish historical and cultural 
differences within humanity. Moreover, togetherness not only creates new 
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points of contact but may also engender new points of conflict. In view of the 
legitimacy potential for a WPC, there is thus a need to rethink the basic onto-
logic of identity from a perspective that is simultaneously compatible with (i) 
the post-structuralist and other critics of false universalisms and (ii) the 
possibility of collective learning and Big History. Ontologically, as the world is 
differentiated, structured and layered, and since it is the condition of being in 
general that there are absences, level-specific voids, differences, contrasts etc, 
there must always be certain differences, contrasts and exclusions also within 
humanity. Among other things, these differences translate into contestations 
over the validity and substance of narratives about human history as a whole. 
  
Usefully, Tzvetan Todorov’s (1984) has distinguished among three axes of 
ego/alter-relations. The first is the epistemological axis. Ego can either know or 
be ignorant of alter’s history, identity and values. Knowledge or ignorance of the 
other can also have deep epistemological roots. From many standpoints, 
differences are difficult to see. Answers to the question ‘how can and should we 
acquire knowledge?’ enable and constrain visions and knowledge of the others. 
Of course, there can be no absolute knowledge but an endless gradation of the 
lower or higher states of knowledge, including in self-knowledge. Nonetheless, 
in the contemporary world, the viewpoint of Big History means better 
knowledge of the others. It also gives grounds for refashioning systems of 
education along non-centric lines of the global imaginary. At least in the 
epistemic and epistemological axis, Big History implies improvement in self-
other relations, as it levels out the roles and contributions of different parts of 
humanity to its common history – that may only be starting. 
 
The axiological axis, the basis for value judgments, is partly independent of 
knowledge. Better knowledge does not necessarily imply more favourable 
judgments (cf. ibid.: 185). Empirical descriptions can be unfavourable in 
relation to cultural background assumptions or prevailing moral reasoning, and 
especially a judgment on the ontological status of others. Thus, it is critical 
whether the other is judged to be an equal or a ‘lower’ being. Modern 
progressive time – and the idea of stages of development – has often defined the 
status of self as advanced and others as inferior in terms of standards of an 
imperial cultural formation. Also Big History allows for learning and 
advancement in human history. Is it necessary that claims to collective learning 
must justify colonialism or imperialism, however tacitly?  
 
Even if it was true that social and cultural developments of humans have gone 
through rather similar – but non-synchronic – structural phases in different parts 
of the planet, it can be argued that temporal advances in terms of ethico-political 
learning do not justify ethico-political hierarchies, violence or repression. With a 
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sufficiently wide horizon of moral identification, it can be acknowledged that 
the socio-cultural development of the others may have been slower and to some 
extent different because of contingent, structural and path-dependent reasons. If 
anything, the parallels and advances have been surprisingly similar. Moreover, 
learning involves also forgetting. Other cultural formations include 
characteristics that ‘we’ may have either forgotten or had never developed, i.e. 
mutual learning is always possible. Moreover, belongings and rights can be 
universally valid also when the others do not reason in a universalistic manner. 
Why should temporally ‘backward’ others be deprived of their entitlements 
when they do not articulate their claims in the same way as we do (cf. Muthu 
2003: 172-209)?  
 
Todorov’s third axis, the praxiological axis, has to do with rapprochement with 
or distancing from other’s real or imagined identity and values in practical 
terms. Neutrality or indifference is a possibility and this implies the capacity to 
take critical distance metaphorically and sometimes also literally. Todorov 
(1984: 185) argues that in the absence of distance-taking there are only two 
possibilities: either the ego embraces the other’s identity and values and 
identifies; or the ego identifies the other with himself. These options imply 
either submission to the other or the other’s submission to oneself.  
 
Todorov fails to give ethico-political room to the idea that their identities can be 
co-constitutive but not exhausted by their mutual relations; and to the possibility 
that interaction between ego and alter may over time transform both.  
Nevertheless, later in the book Todorov writes (ibid.: 249), albeit somewhat 
hesitantly, that ‘we want equality without its compelling us to accept identity; 
but also difference without its degenerating into superiority/inferiority’. This 
opens up further positive possibilities but nonetheless ignores temporality and 
the idea of being as becoming. Any particular human ego and alter are moments 
in the common adventure and cultural evolution of all humankind. Thus the 
category of a co-constitutive and mutually transformative relationship between 
ego and alter should be included in the possibilities, and its centrality for the 
shared identity stressed. Within a higher level identity-in-difference, a co-
constitutive and mutually transformative relationship between self and its others 
can involve letting many differences just be. What is more, the process may lead 
to unexpected learning processes and outcomes. ‘We’ may become something 
different from what we now expect, hope and fear. 
 
The terms of these kinds of debates are very different in the 21st century context 
of global communications than they were in the early 16th century Spain, when 
it was natural for parties to appeal to the Bible in making their case for or 
against the Indians – and no Indian was asked to participate in the debates. In the 
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21st century conversations, the audience is much wider, often truly global, and 
anyone can claim access to the process. This necessitates trans-cultural and 
ecumenical arguments across many divisions (cf. Alker, 1996: ch 4).  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I have argued that while the standard security-military and 
functionalist political economy arguments for planetary unification and political 
community may work to a certain point, they are incomplete and may also, or 
tend to, become counterproductive. What ultimately matter are the moral 
standards and political judgements that constitute multiple political actions and 
struggles in a future WPC. Moreover, this is not merely an empirical, Weberian 
problem. The problem of legitimacy is also normative: whether and why a given 
order or system deserves the allegiance of its members? 
  
Mere security or functionalist benefits, especially if perceived in terms of 
rationally calculative orientation of action, are not enough. There must also be a 
belief in normative legitimacy, which may be anchored in universal principles 
such as popular democracy and human rights. In this light, I have explored 
theories of civilizing process and stages of ethico-political learning. Collective 
human learning not only explains the quest for democratization but also points 
towards cosmopolitan moral sentiments. However, there is an internal 
relationship between democracy and identity, and identities tend to be particular. 
Global-democratic ‘self’-determination presupposes a ‘we’ and ‘us’. Who is this 
‘we’? I have made a case, first, for thinking that otherness can be located in our 
own past or, alternatively, in our contemporary being, when seen from a point of 
view of a possible future position in world history. Second, within a higher level 
identity-in-difference, a co-constitutive and mutually transformative relation 
between self and others can involve letting many differences just be. 
 
Cosmopolitan, planetary identity implies the acknowledgement of irreducible 
differences within humanity itself, however unstable and changing they may be. 
Moreover, these differences can also be seen as drivers of further human 
learning – also concerning our place in the wider cosmic scheme of things. 
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Endnotes 
                                        
1 Even more fundamentally, every telos is necessarily temporary and transitional in some scale of time. There are 
no ultimate ends in the world of multiple simultaneously on-going processes. 
2 Hobbes’ Leviathan can be read as a rhetorical – but also onto-theological – argument that tried to convince 
readers to submit their wills to the sovereign authority of the absolute monarch. Unless they do this, they risk, 
under the conditions of a modern society, the peace of their society with devastating consequences. The ‘state of 
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the nature’ was thus an imagined future possibility, meant to be a ‘shock therapy’ for those who doubted the 
validity of the rule of the Monarch. The argument was targeted against the Cromwellian reformers of Britain, 
who were, in Hobbes’ opinion, causing civil war(s) and political violence. See e.g. Neal, 1988; Connolly, 1993, 
16-40; and Hobbes’ (1974: 101) about the historical non-existence of the ‘state of nature’. 
3 Wells foresaw an aerial war before the innovation of aeroplanes. Furthermore, in 1913, Wells forecasted the 
development of the atomic bomb and nuclear power, and imagined a hugely destructive worldwide atomic war to 
be fought later in the 20th century: ‘it is chaos or the United States of the World for mankind; there is no other 
choice’; this second-hand quote is from Wagar (2004: 141), published originally from the preface of a 1917 
reissue of Wells’ The War in the Air.  
4 I am referring to well-known works such as Piaget (1977, 2002), Kohlberg (1971, 1973, 1981) and Habermas 
(1979, 1990a, 1990b). For discussions on the empirical validity of the Kohlbergian framework in particular, see 
e.g. Boom, Wouters and Keller, 2007; Dawson, 2002; Gibbs, Basinger, Grime and , 2007; Krebs and Denton 
2006; and Sonnert, 1994. In Patomäki (forthcoming), I discuss the criticism according to which any attempt to 
posit a particular discursive or cultural formation, or institutional framework, as ‘progressive’ implies 
(metaphorical or literal) violence and a new unjustified social hierarchy. This criticism can be read 
reconstructively as an important corrective and addendum to critical-reflexive ethico-political reasoning. 
Moreover, I also explore possible further stages of ethico-political learning: history has no end.  
5 The Bourdieun concept of habitus has its origins in Piaget’s genetic structuralism and theories of learning; 
Lizardo, 2004. The habitus of embodied actors is a generative dynamic structure that adopts and accommodates 
itself to a field composed primarily of other embodied actors and geo-historically situated practices and 
institutions within which actors are positioned. A habitus is made possible and constituted by the collective 
historical development of schemata of perception, prototypes, categories, metaphors and framings, and of 
explicit ideas and theories built upon these foundations. 
6 To this extent I agree with Bruno Latour (2004) who criticizes objectivist cosmopolitanism and argues for 
explicit cosmopolitics. For Latour, cosmopolitics recognizes the radical pluralism of understandings and the fact 
‘that the parliament in which a common world could be assembled has got to be constructed from the scratch’ 
(ibid., 462). This goes a bit too far, however, and ignores both the shared geo-historical background of the 
gradually evolving human capabilities and the recently emerged global industrial civilization. The contemporary 
industrial civilization is more global and comprehensive than anything that has occurred before. (See Braudel, 
1995: 8-14) We have multiple histories and cultures in the context of a single scientific-technological and 
politico-economic global civilization that includes a number of international, regional and global institutions (for 
a discussion on the proposals for a practical world parliament from this perspective, see Patomäki 2007). 
Although Latour thus overstates his case, I concur that all attempts to narratize world or global histories are, and 
will be in the foreseeable future, mediated by the pre-existing multiple cultures. 
